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Abstract—This paper introduces an efficient and spontaneous
privacy-preserving protocol for vehicular ad-hoc networks based
on revocable ring signature. The proposed protocol has three
appealing characteristics: First, it offers conditional privacy-
preservation: while a receiver can verify that a message issuer is
an authorized participant in the system only a trusted authority
can reveal the true identity of a message sender. Second, it
is spontaneous: safety messages can be authenticated locally,
without support from the roadside units or contacting other
vehicles. Third, it is efficient by offering fast message authen-
tication and verification, cost-effective identity tracking in case
of a dispute, and low storage requirements. We use extensive
analysis to demonstrate the merits of the proposed protocol and
to contrast it with previously proposed solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, over six million crashes occur on U.S. highways.
These accidents kill more than 42,000 people, injure three
million others, and cost more than $230 billion per year[1].
To reduce the number and the severity of these crashes
and to improve driving experience, car manufactures and the
telecommunication industry recently have geared up to equip
each vehicle with wireless devices that allow vehicles to
communicate with each other as well as with the roadside
infrastructure[2], [4]. These wireless communication devices
installed on vehicles, also known as onboard units (OBUs), and
the roadside units (RSUs), form a self-organized Vehicular Ad
Hoc Network (VANET)[5], [10]. VANETs inherently provide
a way to collect traffic and road information from vehicles,
and to deliver road services including warnings and traffic
information to users in the vehicles.
Extensive research efforts have been made by both industry
and academia to investigate key issues in VANETs[5], [6],
[7], with security and privacy preservation as two primary
concerns[10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18],
[8], [9]. Without security and privacy guarantees, attacks may
jeopardize the VANET’s benefits: a malicious attack, such as a
modification and replay attack on the disseminated messages,
could be fatal to some users. Meanwhile, an attacker could
trace the locations of the vehicles and obtain their moving
patterns if user-related private information has not been pro-
tected. Hence, providing privacy-preserving safety message1
authentication has become a fundamental design requirement
in securing VANETs.
The goals of privacy and liability are conflicting. On the
one hand, a well-behaved OBU is willing to offer as much
local information as possible to neighboring OBUs and RSUs
to create a safer driving environment on condition that its
privacy has been well protected. On the other hand, a malicious
OBU may abuse the privacy protection mechanism. This
may particularly happen when a driver who is involved in
a dispute event of safety messages may attempt to avoid
legal responsibility. Therefore, the privacy-preserving message
authentication in VANETs should be conditional, such that a
trusted authority can disclose the real identity of targeted OBU
in case of a traffic event dispute, even though the OBU itself
is not traceable by the public.
The existing security and privacy solutions for VANETs can
mainly be categorized into three classes. The first one is based
on a large number of anonymous keys (denoted as LAB in the
following)[11], [14], the second one is based on a pure group
signature (denoted as GSB in the following)[12], [13], while
the last one employs the RSU to assist vehicle in authenticating
messages (denoted as RSUB in the following)[15], [16], [17].
Though all of these solutions can meet the conditional privacy
requirement, they face obstacles in real deployments. First,
the LAB scheme is not efficient in terms of used storage and
dispute solving. Second, although the GSB scheme does not
require each vehicle to store a large number of anonymous
keys, the time for message verification grows linearly with the
number of revoked vehicles. Worse, the unrevoked vehicles
have to update their private key and group public key with
the group manager when the number of revoked vehicles
surpasses some predefined threshold. This problem may be
fatal for VANET as they scale to cover all vehicles in a
country/continent.2. Finally, the RSUB protocol achieves much
better efficiency than the previous ones, however, the cost of
deploying RSUs is high thus only some of the roads can
1A safety message reports on the state of the sender vehicle, e.g., its
location, speed, heading, etc.
2At the moment, there are in the order of some hundreds of millions of
cars registered world wide
be covered especially at the initial deployment stage of the
VANET. Therefore, this solution may not be feasible in case
of the absence of the RSU.
To address these issues, this paper proposes an effi-
cient and spontaneous conditional privacy preservation pro-
tocol for intervehicle communication based on revocable ring
signature[34]. Compared to previous message-authentication
schemes[10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18],
[8], [9], our scheme has the following unparalleled features:
(1) Conditional privacy: Using the revocable ring signature
to secure the intervehicle communication, enables preserving
privacy regarding user identity and location of the vehicle,
and the identities of the target vehicles can be only revealed
by the trusted authority; (2) Efficiency: The proposed protocol
can efficiently deal with a growing revocation list instead of
relying on a large storage space at each vehicle or updating the
group public key and private key at all unrevoked vehicles; (3)
Spontaneity: The proposed protocol does not employ RSUs to
assist vehicles in authenticating messages while providing fast
message authentication and verification and an efficient con-
ditional privacy tracking mechanism. We believe this protocol
is an excellent candidate for the future VANETs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II surveys the related work. Section III presents the problem
formulation, system architecture, and design objectives. Sec-
tion IV details the proposed security protocol, followed by the
security analysis and the performance analysis in Section V
and Section VI, respectively. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. System Model
The considered system includes two types of entities: the
Transportation Regulation Center (TRC), and the moving
vehicles equipped with OBUs.
• OBU: All vehicles need to be registered with the TRC and
preloaded with public system parameters and their own
private key before the vehicle can join the VANETs. The
use of secret information such as private keys generates
the need for a tamper-proof device in each vehicle. The
access to this device is restricted to authorized parties.
OBUs are mobile and moving most of the time. When the
OBUs are on the road, they regularly broadcast routine
safety messages, such as position, current time, direction,
speed, traffic conditions, traffic events, to help drivers
get a better awareness of their environment and take
early action to respond to an abnormal situation (Fig. 1).
Compared with the RSUs, the population of OBUs in the
system could be up to millions, whereas the number of
RSUs is at most tens of thousands based on the national
infrastructure construction.
• TRC: TRC is in charge of the registration all OBUs each
vehicle is equipped with. The TRC can reveal the real
identity of a safety message sender whenever there is
a situation where the involved vehicles’ IDs need to be
revealed. The TRC has sufficient computation and storage
capability, and is fully trusted by all parties in the system.
Communication technology
IEEE 802.11p
Transportation
Regulation Center
Fig. 1. System model: Road Emergency Operation under VANET
Unlike other schemes, our solution does not employ RSUs.
The network dynamics are characterized by quasi-permanent
mobility, high speeds, and (in most cases) short connection
times between neighbors. The medium used for communica-
tions between neighboring OBUs is 5.9 GHz Dedicated Short
Range Communication (DSRC)[21] IEEE 802.11p.
B. Related Work
Many studies have been reported on the security and
privacy-preservation issues for VANETs[10], [11], [12], [13],
[14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [8], [9]. Xi et al.[8], [9] in-
troduced a random key-set-based authentication protocol to
preserve the vehicle’s privacy. However, they only provide
the unconditional anonymity without an effective and efficient
tracking mechanism. To achieve both message authentication
and conditional anonymity, Raya et al.[10], [11] introduced
a security protocol in VANETs, namely LAB protocol, by
requiring a large number of private keys and corresponding
anonymous certificates to be installed at each vehicle. A
vehicle randomly selects one of these anonymous certificates
and uses its corresponding private key to sign each launched
message. The other vehicles use the public key of the sender
enclosed in the anonymous certificate to authenticate the
source of the message. These anonymous certificates are
generated by employing the pseudo-identity of the vehicles,
instead of taking any real identity information of the drivers.
Each certificate has a short life time to meet the drivers’privacy
requirement. Although LAB protocol can effectively meet
the conditional privacy requirement, it is inefficient and may
become a scalability bottleneck. Because sufficient numbers
of certificates must be issued for each vehicle to maintain
anonymity over a significant period of time. As a result, the
certificate database to be searched by an authority in order to
match a compromised certificate to its owners identity is huge.
Subsequently, Lin et al.[14] developed a time-efficient
and secure vehicular communication scheme (TSVC) based
on the TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant
Authentication)[22]. With TSVC, a vehicle first broadcasts a
commitment of hash chain to its neighbors and then uses the
elements of the hash chain to generate a message authentica-
tion code (MAC) with which other neighbors can authenticate
this vehicles’ following messages. Because of the fast speed
of MAC verification, the communication and computation
overhead of TSVC has been reduced significantly. However,
TSVC also requires a huge set of anonymous public/private
key pairs as well as their corresponding public key certificates
to be preloaded in each vehicle. Furthermore, TSVC is not
robust when the dynamics of traffic becomes large since a
vehicle should broadcast its key chain commitment much more
frequently.
Lin et al.[12], [13] proposed a security protocol, i.e. GSB
protocol, based on the group signature[28]. With GSB, only a
private key and the group public key are stored in the vehicle,
and the messages are signed according to the group signature
scheme without revealing any identity information to the
public. This assures that the trusted authority is equipped with
the capability of exposing the identity of a sender. However,
the time for safety message verification grows linearly with the
number of revoked vehicles in the revocation list. Hence, each
vehicle has to spend more time on safety message verification.
Furthermore, when the number of revoked vehicles in the
revocation list is larger than some threshold, the protocol
requires every remaining vehicle to calculate a new private key
and group public key based on the exhaustive list of revoked
vehicles whenever a vehicle is revoked. The means for system
parameters to be effectively updated to remaining vehicles, in
a reliable and scalable fashion, is not explored and represents
an important obstacle to the success of this scheme.
Recently, Zhang et al.[15], [16] proposed a novel RSU-
aided message authentication scheme, that is RSUB, which
makes RSUs responsible for verifying the authenticity of
messages sent from vehicles and for notifying the results back
to vehicles. In this scheme, the vehicles have lower computa-
tion and communication overhead than the previous reported
schemes. Independently, Lu et al. [17] introduced an efficient
conditional privacy preservation protocol in VANETs by the
generation of on-the-fly short-time anonymous keys between
vehicles and RSUs, which also can provide fast anonymous
authentication and privacy tracking. Both of these schemes
explore an important feature of VANETs by employing RSUs
to assist vehicles in authenticating messages. However, RSUs
may not cover all the roads, especially in the initial VANETs
deployment stage, or due to the physical damage of some
RSUs, or simply for economic considerations.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Objectives
To avoid reinventing the wheel, we refer the readers to other
works[12], [11] for a full discussion of the attacker model. In
the context of this work, we focus on the following security
objectives.
1) Efficient anonymous authentication of safety messages:
The proposed scheme should provide an efficient and
anonymous message authentication mechanism. First, all
accepted messages should be delivered unaltered, and
the origin of the messages should be authenticated to
guard against impersonation attacks. Meanwhile, from
the perspective of vehicle owners, it may not be accept-
able to leak personal information, including identity and
location, while authenticating messages. Therefore, pro-
viding a secure yet anonymous message authentication
is critical to the applicability of VANETs. Furthermore,
the proposed scheme should be efficient in terms of
fast verification on the safety messages and minimal
anonymous keys storage at OBUs.
2) Efficient tracking of the source of a disputed safety
message: An important and challenging issue in these
conditions is enabling TRC to retrieve a vehicle’s real
identity from its pseudo identity when a signature is
in dispute or when the content of a message is bogus.
Otherwise, anonymous authentication only can prevent
an outside attack, but cannot deal with an inside one.
That is to say, an insider can launch a bogus message
spoofing attack or an impersonation attack successfully
if the identity of the message sender can not be traced by
the authorities. So it is necessary to provide traceability
for the safety message to prevent the inside attack, oth-
erwise concerns about the security may prevent vehicle
owners from joining this system.
3) Multilevel Anonymity[8]: Privacy is a user-specific re-
quirement and some users may be more serious about
their privacy than others. Thus, it is noted that the
proposed protocol should support multiple anonymity
levels, and each vehicle should be allowed to choose
its own anonymity level. The authentication protocol
should provide a tradeoff between the anonymity level
and resource utilization.
B. Bilinear Maps
Since bilinear maps[23] are the basis of our proposed
scheme, we briefly introduce them here.
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of prime order q. Let
P be a generator of G1. Assume that the discrete logarithm
problem in both G1 and G2 is hard. Suppose there exists a
computable bilinear map eˆ such that eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 with
the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: For all P1, P2 ∈ G1, and a, b ∈ Zq ,
eˆ(aP1, bP2) = eˆ(P1, P2)
ab
.
2) Non-degeneracy: eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1G2 .
Such an admissible bilinear map eˆ can be constructed
by the modified Weil or Tate pairing on elliptic curves.
For example, the Tate pairing on MNT curves[24] gives the
efficient implementation, and the representations of G1 can be
expressed in 161 bits when the order q is a 160-bit prime. By
this construction, the discrete logarithm problem in G1 can
reach 80-bit security level.
C. Ring Signature
The ring signature scheme, introduced by Rivest, Shamir
and Tauman[26], is characterized by two main properties:
anonymity and spontaneity. Anonymity in ring signature
means 1-out-of-n signer verifiability, which enables the signer
to keep anonymous in these “rings” of diverse signers. Spon-
taneity is a property which makes the distinction between ring
signatures and group signatures[27], [28]. Group signatures
allow the anonymity of a real signer in a group to be revoked
by a trusted party called group manager. It also gives the group
manager the absolute power of controlling the formation of the
group. The ring signature, on the other hand, does not allow
anyone to revoke the signer anonymity, while allowing the
real signer to form a ring arbitrarily without being controlled
by any other party. Since Rivest el al.’s scheme, many ring
signature schemes have been proposed[29], [30], [31], [32],
[33].
Recently, Liu et al.[34] have introduced a new variant for
the ring signature, called revocable ring signature. This scheme
allows a real signer to form a ring arbitrarily while allowing
a set of authorities to revoke the anonymity of the real signer.
In other words, the real signer will be responsible for what
has signed as the anonymity is revocable by authorities while
the real signer still has the freedom on ring formation. We
use this scheme as the basis for our efficient and spontaneous
conditional privacy-preservation protocol.
IV. EFFICIENT AND SPONTANEOUS VEHICULAR
COMMUNICATIONS SCHEME
This section describes in detail our efficient and spontaneous
privacy-preserving protocol for VANET. Each vehicle dynam-
ically collects the public keys of other vehicles it encounters
during its journey. Noted that this set of public keys keeps
changing over time. When the OBU wants to send a message,
it uses these public keys as its own group members to generate
the revocable ring signature. Furthermore, the identity of the
sender can only be recovered by the trusted authority.
The proposed scheme includes the following four phases:
system initialization, OBU safety message generation and
sending, OBU safety message verification, and OBU fast
tracking algorithm. The notation used throughout this paper
is listed in Table I.
A. System Initialization
Firstly, as described in section II-A, we assume each vehicle
is equipped with a tamper-proof device, which is secure
against any compromise attempt in any circumstance. With
the tamper-proof device on vehicles, an adversary cannot
extract any data stored in the device including key material,
data, and codes [11], [18]. We assume that there is a trusted
Transportation Regulation Center (TRC) which is in charge
of checking the vehicle’s identity, and generating and pre-
distributing the private keys of the vehicles. Prior to the
network deployment, the TRC sets up the system parameters
for each OBU as follows:
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Notations Descriptions
TRC: Transportation Regulation Center
RL: Revocation List
Vi: The ith vehicle
G1, G2: two cyclic groups of same order q
P : The generator of G1
RIDi : The real identity of the vehicle Vi
IDi : The pseudo-identity of the vehicle Vi
M : A message sent by the vehicle Vi
xi : The private key of the vehicle Vi
yi = xiP : The corresponding public key of the vehicle Vi
xTRC : The private key of the TRC
yTRC = xTRCP : The corresponding public key of the TRC
H(·) : A hash function such as H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq
a ‖ b String concatenation of a and b
• Let G1, G2 be two cyclic groups of same order q. Let
eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear map.
• The TRC first randomly chooses xTRC ∈R Zq as its
private key, and computes yTRC = xTRCP as its public
key. The TRC also chooses a secure cryptographic hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq .
• The TRC generates a public and private key pair (xi, yi)
for each vehicle Vi with real identity RIDi as fol-
lows: By using xTRC , the TRC first computes xi =
H(xTRC , RIDi) ∈ Zq , and then sets yi = xiP ∈ G1. In
the end, the TRC stores the (yi, RIDi) in its records.
• Each vehicle is preloaded with the public parameters
{G1,G2, q, yTRC ,H}. In addition, the tamper-proof de-
vice of each vehicle is preloaded with its private/public
key pairs (xi, yi) and corresponding anonymous cer-
tificates (these certificates are generated by taking the
vehicle’s pseudo-identity IDi). Finally, the vehicle will
preload the revocation list (RL) from the TRC.
B. OBU Safety Message Generation
Vehicle Vpi signs the message M before sending it out.
Suppose S = {y1, · · · , yn} is the set of public keys collected
by vehicle Vpi and it defines the ring of unrevoked public
keys. Note that the public key set S, collected and stored
temporarily by Vpi , is dynamic. We assume that all public
keys yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and their corresponding private keys
xi’s are generated by TRC, and pi (1 ≤ pi ≤ n) is the index
of the actual message sender. In other words, as Vpi travels
through the road network, the set of public keys collected by
it keeps changing over time. Otherwise, a unique set of public
keys used by a vehicle may enable the adversary to infer
its traveling trajectory. The signature generation algorithm
Sig(S, xpi, yTRC ,M) is carried out as follows.
1) Randomly select r ∈R Zq and compute R = rP .
2) For yTRC , compute ETRC = eˆ(ypi, yTRC)r.
3) Generate a non-interactive proof SPK(1) as follows:
SPK{α : {ETRC = eˆ(R, yTRC)α}
∧
{
∨
i∈[1,n]
yi =
αP}}(M). The signature σ of M with respect to S
and yTRC is (R,ETRC ) and the transcript of SPK(1).
For clear presentation, we divide SPK(1) into two compo-
nents:
SPK{α : ETRC = eˆ(R, yTRC)
α}(M), (1a)
SPK{α :
∨
i∈[1,n]
yi = αP}(M). (1b)
To generate a transcript of SPK(1a), given
ETRC , R, yTRC , the actual message sender indexed by pi
proves the knowledge of xpi such that ETRC = eˆ(R, yTRC)xpi
by releasing (s, c) as the transcript such that
c = H(yTRC ‖ R ‖ ETRC ‖ eˆ(R, yTRC)
sEcTRC ‖M)
This can be done by randomly picking l ∈R Zq and
computing
c = H(yTRC ‖ R ‖ ETRC ‖ eˆ(R, yTRC)
l ‖M)
and then setting s = l − cxpi mod q.
To generate the transcript of SPK(1b), given S, the actual
message sender indexed by pi, for some 1 ≤ pi ≤ n, proves
the knowledge of xpi out of n discrete logarithms xi, where
yi = xiP , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, without revealing the value of pi.
This can be done by releasing (s1, · · · , sn, c1, · · · , cn) as the
transcript such that c0 =
∑n
i=1 ci mod q and
c0 = H(S ‖ s1P + c1y1 ‖ · · · ‖ snP + cnyn ‖M).
To generate this transcript, the actual message sender first
picks randomly l ∈R Zq and si, ci ∈R Zq for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
i 6= pi, then computes
c0 = H(S ‖ s1P + c1y1 ‖ · · · ‖ spi−1P + cpi−1ypi−1 ‖ lP ‖
spi+1P + cpi+1ypi+1 ‖ · · · ‖ snP + cnyn ‖M)
and finds cpi such that c0 = c1 + · · · + cn mod q. Finally
the actual message sender sets spi = l − cpixpi mod q.
Now we combine the constructions of SPK(1a) and
SPK(1b) together. First, the actual message sender randomly
picks l1, l2 ∈R Zq and si, ci ∈R Zq for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i 6= pi,
then computes
c = H(S ‖ yTRC ‖ R ‖ ETRC ‖ eˆ(R, yTRC)
l1 ‖
s1P + c1y1 ‖ · · · ‖ spi−1P + cpi−1ypi−1 ‖ l2P ‖
spi+1P + cpi+1ypi+1 ‖ · · · ‖ snP + cnyn ‖M).
After that, the actual message sender sets s = l1−cxpi mod
q, finds cpi such that c = c1 + · · · + cn mod q, and sets
spi = l2−cpixpi mod q. The transcript of SPK(1) is therefore
(s, s1, · · · , sn, c1, · · · , cn).
C. Message Verification
Once a message is received, the receiving vehicle first
checks if the RL
⋂
S
?
= ∅. If so, the receiver performs
signature verification by verifying of SPK(1) as follows:
n∑
i=1
ci
?
= H(S ‖ yTRC ‖ R ‖ ETRC ‖
eˆ(R, yTRC)
sE
P
n
i=1
ci
TRC ‖ s1P + c1y1 ‖
· · · ‖ snP + cnyn ‖M).
After that, the receiving vehicle updates its own public key
set by randomly choosing public keys from S.
D. OBU fast tracing
A membership tracing operation is performed when solving
a dispute, where the real ID of the signature generator is
desired. The TRC first checks the validity of the signature
and then uses its private key xTRC and determines if
ETRC
?
= eˆ(yi, R)
xTRC
for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
If the equation holds at, say when i = pi, then the TRC
looks up the record (ypi, RIDpi) to find the corresponding
identity RIDpi meaning that vehicle with identity RIDpi is
the actual message generator. The TRC then broadcasts the
(ypi, RIDpi) to all OBUs and each OBU adds the ypi into his
local revocation list (RL).
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the security of the proposed scheme in terms
of the following four aspects: message authentication, user
identity privacy preservation, traceability by the TRC, and
spontaneity of the signature generator.
• Message authentication. Message authentication is the
basic security requirement in vehicular communications.
In the proposed scheme, the ring signature can only be
generated by the valid ring members. Without knowing
any of the discrete logarithms xi of the public keys yi in
the ring S, it is infeasible to forge a valid ring signature.
• Identity privacy preservation. Given a valid ring signature
σ of some message, it is computationally difficult to
identify the actual signer by any participant in the system
except the TRC. If there exists an algorithm which breaks
the signer anonymity of the construction in Section IV,
then the Indistinguishability Based Bilinear Decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption would be contradicted[34].
• Traceability. Given the signature, only the TRC who
knows xTRC , can trace the real identity of a message
sender using the OBU tracking procedure described in
section IV-D. Besides, the tracing process carried by the
TRC does not require any interaction with the message
generator. Instead, the revocable ring signature itself
provides the authorship information to TRC. Therefore,
once a signature is in dispute, the TRC has the ability to
trace the disputed message, in which the traceability can
be well satisfied.
• Spontaneity. Note that the actual message generator can
specify the ring (a set of vehicles) required to generate
the ring signature arbitrarily based on the public keys
of vehicles it encountered in the past without any new
interaction with any other vehicles or RSUs in the system.
Compared with the schemes [15], [16], [17], our scheme
does not use the RSUs to assist vehicles in authenticating
messages.
• Multilevel privacy. Each vehicle can select the degree of
privacy that fits its own requirements by choosing the
number of public keys used in the message generation
phase. This way, each vehicle can achieve a proper bal-
ance between privacy protection and resource usage. The
multilevel privacy of our scheme gives users flexibility in
defining their privacy requirements.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed
scheme in terms of storage requirements and computational
overheads.
A. Storage Overheads
This subsection compares the OBU storage overhead of our
protocol with three previously proposed protocols: LAB[11],
RSUB[17] and GSB[12]. In the LAB protocol, each OBU
stores not only its own Nokey anonymous key pairs, but also
all the anonymous public keys and their certificates in the
revocation list (the notations adopted in the description are
listed in Table II). Let each key (with its certificate) occupy
one storage unit. If there are m OBUs revoked, then the scale
of revoked anonymous public keys is m · Nokey . Thus, the
total storage overhead in LAB protocol (denoted as SLAB)
is SLAB = (m + 1)Nokey . Assuming that Nokey = 104,
we have SLAB = (m + 1)104. Both in our protocol and
GSB protocol, each OBU stores one private key issued by the
trusted party, and m revoked public keys in the revocation list.
Let SGSB and SRRSB denote the total storage unit of GSB
protocol and our protocol (Revocable Ring Signature Based
protocol) respectively. Thus, SGSB = SRRSB = m+1. In the
RSUB protocol[17], each OBU stores one private key issued
by the trusted party, and a short-time key pair together with
its anonymous certificate issued by the RSU. Since the OBU
does not need to store the revocation list, the storage overhead
in RSUB protocol is only two units, denoted as SRSUB = 2.
Fig.2 shows the storage units of LAB protocol, GSB proto-
col, RSUB protocol and our protocol as m increases. Observe
that the OBU storage overhead in LAB protocol linearly
increases with m, and is much larger than that in the other
three protocols. The storage overhead of GSB protocol and
our protocol is still small in spite of its linear increase with
m. Though the storage overhead in RSUB protocol is the most
efficient, this scheme requires the RSUs, instead of OBUs, to
store the anonymous key pairs, which, nonetheless, is not the
case in the other schemes.
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Fig. 2. Each OBU storage overhead of Raya’s, Lin’s, Lu’s and our protocol
in different m revoked OBUs, m varying from 1 to 100
TABLE II
NOTATIONS AND ROUGH SCALE
Descriptions Scale
Nobu : The number of OBUs in the system 107
Nokey : The number of anonymous keys owned by one OBU 104
Nrsu : The number of RSUs in the system 104
Nrkey : The number of anonymous keys processed by one RSU 104
B. Message Verification Overhead
This subsection compares the OBU computation overhead
for the proposed, RSUB and GSB protocols. Since the point
multiplication in G and pairing computations dominates each
party’s computation overhead, we consider only these opera-
tions in the following estimation. Table III gives the measured
processing time (in milliseconds) for an MNT curve[24] of
embedding degree k = 6 and 160-bit q. The implementation
was executed on an Intel pentium IV 3.0 GHz machine[25].
In our proposed protocol, verifying a message, requires
Tpair +(2n+1)Tpmul, where n is the cardinality of the ring,
as shown in section IV-C. Let TRRSB be the required time
cost in our protocol, then we have:
TRRSB = Tpair+(2n+1)Tpmul = 4.5+ (2n+1)× 0.6(ms)
In the GSB protocol, the time cost to verify a message is
related to the number of revoked OBUs in the revocation list.
Thus the required time is:
TGSB = 6Tpmul+(4+m)Tpair = 6×0.6+(4+m)×4.5(ms)
In the RSUB protocol, to verify a message, it requires
3Tpair + 11Tpmul. Let TRSUB be the required time cost in
RSUB’s protocol, then we have:
TRSUB = 3Tpair+11Tpmul = 3×4.5+11×0.6 = 20.1(ms)
Let
TRG =
TRRSB
TGSB
TABLE III
CRYPTOGRAPHY OPERATION’S EXECUTION TIME
Descriptions Execution Time
Tpmul The time for one point multiplication in G 0.6 ms
Tpair The time for one pairing operation 4.5 ms
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Fig. 3. Time efficiency ratio TRG = TRRSB/TGSB with a number of m
revoked OBUs, m varying from 1 to 100.
be the cost ratio between our proposed protocol and the GSB
protocol. Fig.3 plots the time cost ratio TRG when m OBUs
are revoked, as m ranges from 1 to 100. We observe that the
time cost ratio TRG decreases as m increases, which demon-
strates the much better efficiency of our proposed protocol
than the GSB protocol especially when the revocation list is
large. Note that n can be determined by the user according to
its own computation capacity and privacy requirements.
Let
TRR =
TRRSB
TRSUB
be the cost ratio between our proposed protocol and RSUB
protocol. Fig.4 plots the time cost ratio TRR when n public
key pairs are employed, where the number of n ranges from
1 to 50. We observe that the time cost ratio TRR increases as
n increases, which demonstrates our protocol is slightly more
expensive than RSUB protocol. However, our protocol does
not employ the roadside infrastructures to communicate with
the OBU as in RSUB protocol, which will cause additional
communication overhead.
C. Trusted Authority Computation Complexity on OBU Trac-
ing
In this subsection, we evaluate the trusted authority com-
putation complexity on OBU tracing algorithm. For fair com-
parison, we use the same linear and binary search algorithms
in all of these protocols. We use the same notations as in
the previous sections. Table IV presents the computation com-
plexity for the four protocols. The trusted authority tracking
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Fig. 4. Time efficiency ratio TRR = TRRSB/TRSUB with a number of
n public key pairs, n varying from 1 to 50.
algorithm in our proposed protocol and GSB protocol has the
better efficiency than the other two protocols.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY
Protocol Linear search Binary search
LAB: O(Nobu ·Nokey) O(log(Nobu ·Nokey))
GSB: O(Nobu) O(log(Nobu))
RSUB: O(Nrsu +Nrkey) O(log(Nrsu ·Nrkey))
RRSB: O(Nobu) O(log(Nobu))
VII. SUMMARY
We have presented an efficient, spontaneous, conditional
privacy preserving protocol based on the revocable ring
signature and aimed for secure vehicular communications.
We demonstrate that proposed protocol is not only provides
conditional privacy, a critical requirement in VANETs, but
also able to improve efficiency in terms of the number of
keys stored at each vehicle, identity tracking in case of a
dispute, and, most importantly message authentication and
verification. Meanwhile, our proposed solution can operate
independently: does not require support from the roadside
infrastructure which, at least in the initial deployment stages,
may not cover all road segments.
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